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KEEPING WOMEN IN THE DARK: 
LESSONS NOT LEARNED AND THE REAL 
SINS OF THE BREAST IMPLANT 
MANUFACTURERS 
RICHARD MCCORMICK* 
SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND 
THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE. By MARCIA ANGELL. 
London/New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 1996. Pp. 256. 
The lengthy and erratic relationship between the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) and the silicone gel-filled breast implant manu-
facturers finally fractured on April 16, 1992, when FDA Commissioner 
David Kessler issued a ban I on the sale of what had become a billion-
dollar enterprise2 for Dow Corning and five other corporations.3 Kessler's 
publicly stated reason for the ban was that the manufacturers had not 
* Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
1 See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL 57 (1996). Although silicone breast implants had 
been on the market since 1964, they did not fall within the regulatory power of the FDA until 
1976, when Congress passed the Medical Device Amendments to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic 
Act. See id. at 51. Even then, the implant manufacturers were "grandfathered" and did not have 
to provide immediate evidence of the safety and effectiveness of their product. See id. In 1982, 
however, the FDA proposed a rule to classity implants as Type III Medical Devices, a move that 
would require the manufacturers to produce data showing that implants would not pose a health 
risk. See 47 Fed. Reg. 2,820 (1982) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. § 878) (proposed Jan. 19, 1982). 
The FDA issued a final rule on the classification on June 24, 1988, giving the manufacturers 30 
months to file their premarket approval applications. See 53 Fed. Reg. 23,872-74 (1988) (to be 
codified at 21 c.F.R. § 878). By April of 1991, the manufacturers had still not complied with the 
regulations, and the FDA issued an ultimatum: they must submit their applications within 90 days 
or suspend commercial distribution of the implants. See 56 Fed. Reg. 14,627 (1991) (to be codified 
at 21 C.F.R. § 878). The manufacturers responded unsatisfactorily, producing numerous but 
unhelpful studies. See Philip J. Hilts, Drug Agenl)1 Questions Companies' Safety Data on Breast 
Implants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1991, at B6. Shortly thereafter, the FDA announced a temporary 
moratorium on the sale of implants, which, on the prompt of an advisory panel, evolved into the 
almost-complete ban of April, 1992. SeeANGELL, supra, at 56-57. Only women who had undergone 
mastectomies could obtain silicone implants, and even then the conditions were closely control-
led. See id. Saline-filled implant manufacturers were allowed to continue selling their product, 
but they too must eventually show data on safety. See id. at 60-61. 
2 This estimate represents the peak years of implantation from 1979 to 1992. See ANGELL, 
supra note 1, at 34. 
3 These smaller players were Bristol-Myers Squibb; Baxter International; Bioplasty, Inc.; Men-
tor Corporation; and McGhan Medical Corporation (now Inamed). See id. 
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positively demonstrated the implants' safety in accordance with FDA 
regulations.4 However, his decision was not made in a statutory and 
regulatory vacuum. He was likely also responding to breast implant 
recipients' complaints that implants were the cause of their connective 
tissue diseases (CTDs);5 to the pressures of an aggressive plaintiffs' bar 
that had everything to gain from an FDA ban and all that it implied 
about the safety of implants;6 to consumer groups' chastisement of the 
FDA for dragging its feet for so long; 7 to the sensationalistic media 
coverage of the purported health hazard;8 and to the discovery of Dow 
Corning's internal documents suggesting their knowledge of unfavor-
able or non-existent safety data.9 
But the breast implant debate resounds beyond the political and 
public pressures that influenced Kessler's decision. The larger contro-
versy revolves around women's claims that breast implants have caused 
their illnesses. lO The ensuing litigation of these claims has cost the 
implant manufacturers billions of dollars in jury verdicts and settle-
ments,ll even though the plaintiffs' scientific evidence of causation was 
4 See David Kessler, The Basis of the FDA's Decision on Implants, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1713, 
1713 (1992). As Kessler wrote: "The ... standard is not that devices must be proved unsafe before 
the FDA can protect patients against their use. Rather, the law requires a positive demonstration 
of safety-and the burden of proof rests squarely with the manufacturer." Id. 
5 See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 51-52. CTDs can be the manifestation of an autoimmune 
disease, where the person's immune system can no longer recognize and mounts an attack against 
the body's own cells. See id. at 21. Immune responses directed at connective tissue can result in 
CTDs such as lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, scleroderma, and polymyalgia. See id. Breast implants 
may also cause local complications of inflammation and formation of scar tissue around the 
implants, but most of the litigation concerned CTDs. See id. 
6 See generally id. at 25-26. 
7 See id. at 53. 
8 See id. at 53-54. 
9 See id. at 56; see also infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text (discussing the contents of 
the documents). 
10 See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 21-24. 
11 The first lawsuit was filed by Maria Stern against Dow Corning, alleging that implants 
caused her autoimmune disorder. See id. at 52. In 1984, a jury awarded her close to two million 
dollars. See id. In December, 1991, ajury awarded Mariann Hopkins $840,000 in compensatory 
damages and $6.5 million dollars in punitive damages for her mixed connective tissue disease. 
See Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1119, 1126 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 734 (1995). One year later, Pamela Johnson received a $25 million verdict against Bristol-Myers 
Squibb. See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 134-35. These are just a few of the cases decided in plaintiffs 
favor before a $4.25 billion class-action settlement was approved on April 1, 1994. See id. at 80. 
The settlement prospect had temporarily stalled when Dow Corning filed for bankruptcy protec-
tion on May 15, 1995. See id. at 192. The remaining corporations have since renegotiated a new 
settlement for two to three billion dollars. See Barnaby J. Feder, Dow Corning Offers Plan to End 
Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,1996, at D1. Dow Corning has recently proposed a new plan that would 
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too tenuous to demonstrate a link between the implants and CTDs.12 
Epidemiological studies13 published between 1994 and 1995 confirm 
that there is no clear connection between breast implants and CTDs.14 
Marcia Angell recounts this element of the breast implant saga, its 
foundations and what it has wrought, in her book Science on Trial: The 
Clash of Medical Evidence and the Law in the Breast Implant Case. 15 Part 
I of this Book Review will discuss Dr. Angell'sl6 chief complaint about 
the basis and outcome of the breast implant litigation: verdicts for 
plaintiffs in the face of meager evidence of causation. 
Because breast implants require a medical procedure to insert, it 
is important to view the controversy in light of the special physical and 
end its credit woes, offering breast implant recipients $600 million initially, with an additional 
payment of $1.4 billion only if the results of a trial on causation show that implants can cause 
disease. See id. Dow Corning Corporation's commercial creditors, however, have proposed a 
different settlement that would pay $1. 75 billion into a Claims Trust set up to compensate women, 
regardless of any causation issues. See Thomas M. Burton, Dow Corning Creditor Group Files Its 
Plan, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 1997, at B6.Judge Arthur J. Spector of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan is expected to decide between the two proposals sometime in 
the first half of 1997. See id. 
12 See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 27; see also Donald A. Lawson, Note, Hopkins v. Dow Corning 
Corporation: Silicone and Science, 37 JURIMETRICS J. 53, 66-68 (1996) (stating that the "paucity" 
of the scientific evidence based on anecdotes and toxicological studies would not support an 
inference that breast implants cause CTDs). 
Some of the evidence offered by the plaintiffs may have also been unreliable. See Gary 
Tauibes, Silicone in the System, DISCOVER, Dec. 1995, at 64, 70. A frequent collaborator with 
plaintiffs attorneys, Dr. Nir Kossovsky has supposedly developed a test able to detect autoimmune 
antibody reactions caused by silicone. See id. However, researchers at the Scripps Research 
Institute doubt the validity of his findings, as Kossovsky's test has failed to distinguish autoimmu-
nity in women with or without implants. See id. In addition, Kossovsky's reported data is based 
on subject populations too small to yield statistically significant results. See id. at 71. 
13 Epidemiological studies are "scientific surveys of the incidence of disease in samples of 
different groups." ANGELL, supra note 1, at 23. Essentially, these studies can determine if women 
with implants have a higher risk of developing CTDs than women without implants. See id. For 
a discussion of the value of epidemiological studies in the determination of disease causation, 
see infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text. 
14 See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 100-03. These studies have not ruled out a very small link 
between implants and connective tissue disease. See id. at 102-03. However, such a risk is not in 
proportion to the 248,500 women (out of a total of one to two million) with implants who claim 
to have such illnesses. See id. at 80, 100-03. In a paper co-authored by David Kessler, researchers 
at the FDA came to a similar conclusion after reviewing all of the published studies: they do not 
indicate a large increase in CTDs among women with breast implants when compared to the 
general population of women, although a moderate risk may still exist. See Barbara G. Silverman 
et aI., &ported Complications of Silicone Gel Breast Implants: An Epidemiological Review, 124 ANNALS 
OF INTERNAL MED. 744, 754-55 (1996). 
15 ANGELL, supra note 1. 
16 She is a physician and the executive editor of the New England Journal of Medicine. See 
id. at 9. 
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intangible harm women have suffered at the hands of doctors and the 
manufacturers of medical devices and pharmaceuticals; therefore, Part 
II of this Review will lay out women's experiences with physicians and 
with pharmaceuticals and medical devices. Part III will focus on the 
manufacturers' knowledge and conduct in testing and marketing the 
implants. Part IV will explore the element of causation in tort law, why 
it is required, and why the breast implant manufacturers should not 
be held liable for the physical systemic injuries of the plaintiffs. Finally, 
Part V will consider the idea of a dignitary tort to compensate breast 
implant recipients and deter manufacturers from risky marketing prac-
tices. 
1. A SCIENTIFIC APPROACH TO CAUSATION AND THE PROCLAIMED 
INNOCENCE OF THE BREAST IMPLANT MANUFACTURERS 
The element of causation is the sturdy hook upon which Marcia 
Angell hangs both her outrage and her argumentP She correctly 
bemoans the windfalls plaintiffs have received, because they were never 
able to prove that implants were the cause in fact of their illnesses. IS 
Dr. Angell's input on this issue is informed by her medical training: 
she brings to the breast implant debate a classic scientist's perspective 
on causation. 19 First, she believes that causation in disease is best viewed 
in terms of "risk factors. "20 Second, and more importantly, she believes 
that epidemiological studies are the only way to determine whether a 
risk factor actually exists.21 When the plaintiffs burden of production 
is viewed through the lens of science, then, it becomes evident that 
17 See generally id. at 21-24. 
18 See infra Part IV for a discussion about why a lack of causation will bar recovery. 
19 See Troyen A. Brennan, Untangling Causation Issues in Law and Medicine: Hazardous 
Substance Litigation, 107 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 741, 741-43 (1987) (discussing the divergent 
views of causation in the law and science: judges tend to rely on mechanistic corpuscularian-based 
models of causal chains, while scientists recognize that causal concepts are best represented by a 
probability of association). 
20 See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 98. In eschewing the language of "cause" in favor of "contri-
bution," "risk factor," "association," and other probabilistic terms, she emphasizes the fact that 
many diseases do not have a single necessary and sufficient cause. See id. That is, breast implants 
may increase the "chances" of developing CTDs, but they are not required or sufficient to do so, 
as is evidenced by women without implants who develop CTDs and those with implants who do 
not. See id. at 97-98. 
21 See id. at 100. Before it can be determined if breast implants caused CTDs in any particular 
plaintiff (Le., proof of specific causation), it must first be settled if implants can cause CTDs at all 
(i.e., proof of general causation). See id. at 115. The only way to do this is through epidemiological 
studies. See id. If CTDs do not occur more often in women with implants than without them, 
1997] BOOK REVIEWS 417 
they failed to offer evidence to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that implants are associated with CTDs.22 
Given the limited scientific evidence of causation, Dr. Angell muses 
upon the impetus behind frivolous litigation and the foundations of 
baseless jury verdicts, and asks "How could the law have been so far 
out in front of the scientific evidence ... ?"23 She ultimately lays the 
blame on several culprits. First, she reproaches the greed of the plain-
tiffs' lawyers24 and expert witnesses,25 and of the plaintiffs themselves.26 
Second, she blames the hysteria of the American public, fomented by 
the media's coverage of the "alarm of the day. "27 Third, she criticizes 
the use of lay juries in cases involving complex scientific or technical 
testimony; she fears that the jurors in the breast implant litigation may 
not have been up to the task of truly comprehending evidence of 
disease causation,28 and may have returned verdicts based more on 
sympathy for the clearly aggrieved plaintiffs than on sense.29 Finally, 
she casts doubt on the evidentiary rules of the legal system and their 
then, barring an error in statistical analysis or a subject sample size too small to detect a link, 
general causation has not been proven. See id. at 102-03. Dr. Angell's primary criticism of the 
expert testimony proffered by plaintiffs is that it practically assumed general causation without 
reference to epidemiological data, and then proceeded to present a theory of how breast implants 
may cause autoimmune disease. See id. at 105-08. 
22 See id. at 113-14. 
23Id. at 23. 
24 See generally id. at 133-53. 
25 See ANGELL, supra note I, at 133-53. 
26 See id. 
27 See generally id. at 154-76. 
28 See id. at 204. Dr. Angell similarly writes of an anti-science sentiment among the American 
public, see id. at 171-83, and how anecdote and surmise, tempered by political and social 
inclinations, have surpassed fact in a juror's mind, see id. at 183-91. Juries therefore may be 
unsophisticated and incapable of separating the chaff of fringe science from the grain of the 
established scientific community. See, e.g., Brief for the American Association for the Advance-
ment of Science and the National Academy of Sciences as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
dents at 5, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993) (No. 92-102). But see Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss, Is Science a Special Case? The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow, 73 TEx. L. REv. 1779, 1796-1800 (1995) (arguing that juries are not overwhelmed 
by scientific evidence and do not allow it to take on an aura of mythic infallibility). To be fair to 
the juries in these cases, however, it should be understood that the scientific evidence they were 
evaluating was deemed admissible by the trial judges, and all of the verdicts came before the 
contrary epidemiological studies were published. See generally Lawson, supra note 12, at 68. The 
jury simply used the only evidence it had. See id. 
29 See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 74-75. Many of the plaintiffs lawyers commingled the 
elements of causation and damages in order to support the weakness of the former with the 
strength of the latter. See id. at 74. 
Perhaps a more cogent way to reconcile the jury verdicts with lack of causation is to realize 
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ability to discern the conclusory opinions of expert witnesses from valid 
scientific analysis based on verifiable data.30 
Dr. Angell has written a finely detailed and insightful book; the 
breast implant litigation juggernaut is laid bare by her penetrating 
analysis. In her rush to point a finger at the failures and foibles of the 
legal establishment, however, she elides the greed of the breast implant 
manufacturers. She claims that the "derelictions of the manufacturers 
paled in comparison" to the greed of the plaintiffs' attorneys,31 but the 
manufacturers in the breast implant case surely had their own profit 
motives to satisfY-and they did so at the expense of women. Allowing 
that breast implants do not cause CTDs, the manufacturers still acted 
in bad faith by marketing a product without warnings when they had 
good reason to believe that it was unsafe. 32 Their actions may not have 
caused physical injury, but they translated into an insult to the auton-
omy and dignity of women-an insult that has long existed in the 
healthcare industry. 
that jurors are consumers of products. Even defense counsel in products liability cases admit as 
much. See Robert L. Haig & Stephen P. Caley, Successfully Defending Products Liability Cases, N.Y. 
ST. B.J., Mar./ Apr. 1996, at 16 (suggesting that defense lawyers "impress upon the jury that [their] 
client is ... a manufacturer or distributor of useful products that are demanded by and benefit 
society, including, very often, consumers like ... jurors"). Accordingly, they are also people who 
rely on the safety of products, and are just as likely to be affected by defective goods as the breast 
implant recipients seemed to be, so the misdeeds ofa manufacturer could be believed by a juror 
to visit them in the form of grievous bodily injury. See Jack W. Snyder, Environmental (Toxic) Torts, 
34 DUQ. L. REv. 899, 903-04 (1996). It is therefore possible that the jury was finding liability on 
the basis of outrage over the manufacturer's deliberately risky conduct, and not only on the harm 
suffered by the plaintiffs. See id. This was probably a critical factor as the jurors became aware of 
the manufacturers' inaction, misrepresentation, and nondisclosure of the possibility of risk of 
CTDs. See id. 
30 See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 131-32. She does this while admitting that the United States 
Supreme Court opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), could 
go a long way in keeping out unsubstantiated scientific theories. See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 
130-32. Daubert held that expert testimony may only be admitted if its basis is scientifically valid 
and relevant to the issue at hand. See 113 S. Ct. at 2795--96. However, Dr. Angell reserved her 
final judgment on the ultimate effectiveness of the decision. See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 132. A 
recent breast implant case may put her fears to rest. In Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 
92-182:J0, 1996 WL 730693 (D. Or. Dec. 18, 1996), Judge Robert E. Jones, presiding over a 
number of cases remanded to the U.S. District Court in Oregon, granted the defendants' motion 
in limine to exclude evidence on causation presented by the plaintiffs' expert witnesses. See id. 
at *17. Judge Jones ruled that their testimony was not admissible under the standard set forth in 
Daubert. See id. 
31 ANGELL, supra note 1, at 202. 
32 See infra Part III (discussing the scientific data available to the breast implant manufactur-
ers before and during marketing). 
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II. WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES AS CONSUMERS OF HEALTH CARE 
Women's reproductive systems and anatomies are under the con-
stant assault of a society obsessed with perfection and convenience.33 
Modern medical technology can assist in creating this culturally-defined 
image of the perfect woman,34 who is at once voluptuous and trim35 
(think Barbie), with an easily manipulable fertility.36 Taking into ac-
count the normal intricacies of gynecological function as welI,3' it 
should come as no surprise that two out of every three healthcare 
dollars in the United States are spent by women.38 As women are being 
"pushed" into becoming greater consumers of healthcare, they are 
33 See generally NAOMI WOLF, THE BEAUTY MYTH: How IMAGES OF BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST 
WOMEN (1991). 
34 See id. at 248. Women who have succumbed to the allure of this image are driven to modifY 
their bodies in accordance with it, through breast augmentation, liposuction, and other cosmetic 
surgery procedures. See id. at 231-32. Whether their decision is driven internally (boosting 
self-esteem) or externally (pleasing the opposite sex) is open to debate. See ANGELL, supra note 
1, at 33--36 (briefly discussing the cultural vicissitudes and personal choices behind breast aug-
mentation). The male medical and corporate establishment, however, have provided the means 
for the transformation. See Rebecca Weisman, Reforms in Medical Device Regulation: An Examina-
tion of the Silicone Gel Breast Implant Debacle, 23 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 973, 991 (1993); WOLF, 
supra note 33, at 232-34, 268. 
35 See WOLF, supra note 33, at 26~7. 
36 See Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, From the Pill to Test-Tube Babies: New options, New Pressures 
in Reproductive Behavior, in HEALING TECHNOLOGY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 23, 31-32 (Kathryn 
Strother Ratcliff et al. eds., 1989). Although women would appear to reap the greater benefit 
from increasingly effective contraception, men too can revel in the freedom: "[W]omen ... 
become both more readily available and disposable, because the sexual relationship is 'without 
consequences.' Men ... are relieved of even more responsibility than before." Id. at 32. In 
addition, women alone bear the health risks of contraception. See id. Their onus has no match 
in the world of male-based contraception. See Kim Yanoshik & Judy Norsigian, Contraception, 
Control, and Choice: International Perspectives, in HEALING TECHNOLOGY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, 
supra, at 61, 70-72. Men have never had to expose themselves to the risk, discomfort, or 
invasiveness of modern contraception because "[a]s the majority of scientists, researchers, devel-
opers, physicians, drug company vendors and executives, and governmental officials, [they] 
control the way contraceptive research is developed and implemented." Id. at 71. Only a small 
percentage of contraception research and development money is spent on male methods. See id. 
at 70. 
37 See Lisa Napoli, The Doctrine of Informed Consent and Women: The Achievement of Equal 
Value and Equal Exercise of Autonomy, 4 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 335, 340-42 (1996). 
38 See Charles Mann, Women's Health Research Blossoms, 269 SCIENCE 766, 767 (1995). Women 
may also pay more than men because they are less likely to have jobs that provide health 
insurance, or they may not work at all. See Patricia Braus, Sex and the Single SPender, AM. 
DEMOGRAPHICS, Nov. 1993, at 28, 32. 
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also, perversely, being pushed into a greater danger of medical maloc-
currence. Gender disparities in treatment and diagnosis of female and 
male patients adversely affect the quality of healthcare that women 
receive.39 Women are also the victims of iatrogenic harm at the hands 
of inept cosmetic surgeons.40 
39 Studies have shown that a woman's gender-neutral symptoms are treated less seriously than 
identical male complaints. See Karen A. Armitage et aI., Response of Physicians to Medical Com-
plaints in Men and Women, 241 JAMA 2186 (1979); Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, 
American Medical Association, Gender Disparities in Clinical Decision Making, 266 JAMA 559, 
561-62 (1991) [hereinafter Gender Disparities]. This difference in treatment may be due to bias 
in perceived gender roles. See Gender Disparities, supra, at 561. For example, men might receive 
more kidney transplants than women because their role as the "bread winner" of the family is 
awarded with the less cumbersome alternative of transplant instead of dialysis. See id. In other 
cases the bias is more discreet: although heart disease is the number one killer of women (in 
fact, it strikes both men and women equally), most doctors do not recognize the warning signs 
peculiar to women, possibly because of the common misconception that heart disease is solely a 
male concern. See For Women Sick at Heart, TUFTS UNIV. DIET & NUTRITION NEWSL., Nov. 1, 
1995, at 2. 
Another explanation for gender disparities may be that doctors attribute women's symptoms 
to an emotional and overanxious reaction to some perturbance in their health. See Gender 
Disparities, supra, at 561; Napoli, supra note 37, at 336. Women with test results indicating a 
cardiac abnormality were still twice as likely to have their symptoms attributed to a psychiatric or 
noncardiac etiology. See Gender Disparities, supra, at 560. History bears this out as, up until 1982, 
physicians still ascribed many of women's complaints to "hysteria." See George E. Murphy, The 
Clinical Management of Hysteria, 247 JAMA 2559 (1982); see also WOLF, supra note 33, at 268 
(stating that women have been regimented into compliancy through the over-prescription of 
tranquilizers); Patricia Peppin, Feminism, Law, and the Pharmaceutical Industry, in CORPORATE 
CRIME: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES 87, 89 (Frank Pearce & Laureen Snider, eds. 1995) [hereinafter 
Peppin, Feminism] (stating that older women presenting gender-neutral symptoms are more likely 
than men to be prescribed mood-altering drugs). But see ANGELL, supra note 1, at 182 (stating 
that the medical profession, for the most part, no longer treats women's illnesses as being 
psychosomatic) . 
Some decision making disparities are not due directly to gender bias on the part of the 
treating physician. See Gender Disparities, supra, at 560-61. Inaccurate diagnoses and insufficient 
therapies may be based on imperfect information about female physiology and the symptoms it 
manifests when diseased. See id. This bias is due in large part to the historical exclusion of women 
as subjects in clinical research and trials. See id. at 559; see also 1 COMMITTEE ON THE ETHICAL 
AND LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN IN CLINICAL STUDIES, INSTITUTE OF 
MEDICINE, WOMEN AND HEALTH RESEARCH: ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF INCLUDING WOMEN 
IN CLINICAL STUDIES 27 (Anna C. Mastroianni et al. eds., 1994). This "male-model" of disease 
has created a gap in the knowledge that informs clinical decision making, and has resulted in 
poorer healthcare for women. See Gender Disparities, supra, at 559. But see Mann, supra note 38, 
at 767 (stating that more of the National Institute of Health's research budget is spent on female 
diseases than male diseases, and that clinical trials for gender-neutral diseases now include equal 
numbers of men and women). 
40 See generally Unqualified Doctors Performing Cosmetic Surgery: Policies and Enforcement Ac-
tivities of the Federal Trade Commission-Part I: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Regulation, 
Business Opportunities and Energy afthe Comm. an Small Businesses, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) 
(cataloging the gender-neutral and specific harms that women have suffered; horror stories 
involving tummy tucks, facelifts, and acid peels abound). For instance, when scar tissue forms 
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Some of the most extreme trespasses against women are of an 
informational character, although the harm often extends into the 
physical. The first type of informational harm concerns unnecessary 
surgeries performed on women without disclosure of less invasive 
alternatives. The second type encompasses physical harm that flows 
directly from pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers' fail-
ure to disclose risks associated with their products. 
A. Unnecessary Surgery and the Expropriation of Women's 
Decisionmaking Capabilities 
The doctor-patient relationship has always been one of inherent 
imbalanceY The doctor's special knowledge and aura of breeding and 
education give him a larger share of power over the course and extent 
of treatment.42 The atmosphere of silence and authority established by 
the physician reduces the patient to a subsidiary participant in the 
quest to cure the disease, thus excluding the patient from a decision-
making process that will ultimately affect him or her.43 This occurs at 
a time when the patient's body is in revolt-a time in which vulnerabil-
ity creates an even greater need for the patient to have a voice in the 
search for a cure.44 This asymmetrical power distribution is magnified 
around breast implants, the resultant misshapen breast can be forced back into shape in a simple 
but painful procedure called a "closed capsulotomy." See ANGELL, supra note I, at 41. The 
physician forcefully squeezes the breast to dissipate the dense scar tissue and return the breast 
to its normal shape and consistency. See id. at 41-42. The result is often temporary, as scar tissue 
generally reforms. See id. at 42. What often attends this procedure is acute inflammation and 
trauma to the breast, and rupture of the implant itself, spreading silicone throughout the breast 
tissue where it may be transported to the lymph nodes. See id. at 41-42. Although the breast 
implant manufacturers warned of the possibility of rupture accompanying this procedure, some 
doctors persisted in its use. See id. at 135. The inherent brutality of this procedure also shows a 
lack of compassion for the female patient. See id. 
Furthermore, women are more likely than men to be harmed by their physicians in ways 
that demand punitive damages. See Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, His and Her Tart Reform: 
Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REv. I, 58-59 (1995). Approximately two-thirds of all 
punitive damages verdicts for medical malpractice are awarded to women. See id. at 59-61. The 
spectrum of wrongdoing in these cases includes sexual misconduct, see id. at 64-66, injury due 
to gross incompetence, see id. at 71-75, and extreme failure of informed consent, see id. at 69-71. 
41 See generally JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 1-29 (1984) (laying 
out the history of the medical profession's attitudes toward patients). 
42 See generally SUE FISHER, IN THE PATIENT'S BEST INTEREST: WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF 
MEDICAL DECISIONS 45-58 (1986). 
43 See KATZ, supra note 41, at 28-29; Patricia Peppin, Power and Disadvantage in Medical 
Relationships, 3 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 221, 222-23 (1994) [hereinafter Peppin, Power and Disad-
vantage]. 
44 See Peppin, Power and Disadvantage, supra note 43, at 222-23. 
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when the patient is female, because the profession has traditionally 
been male-dominated45 and has failed to appreciate the female per-
spective.46 
The combination of doctor-patient and male-female roles creates 
an environment ripe for the violation of women's autonomy and bodily 
integrity.47 Although these interests may be protected by the doctrine 
of informed consent,48 they have nonetheless been abrogated in many 
cases of hysterectomies49 and cesarean sections. 50 These procedures are 
the two most commonly performed surgeries in the United States, but 
they have been heavily criticized as being unnecessary in many in-
stances.51 
Hysterectomies are frequently prescribed by physicians without 
full explanation of the risks and alternatives;52 this can be inferred from 
the fact that the procedure is not usually medically necessary.53 Preva-
lent attitudes toward female reproductive systems might be responsible 
45 See]. Duncan Moore,jr., Ranks of Physicians Continue to Swell, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Mar. 
4, 1996, at 2. However, the population of female doctors has been steadily growing. See id. In 
1970 they accounted for only 7.7% of all doctors; by 1994, the profession was 19.5% women. See 
id. This rising tide is expected to continue: in 1994, medical school enrollment of women was 
nearly 42%. See Andrea Peyser, Gains: We've Come a Long Way, Baby!, COSMOPOLITAN, May 
1994, at 198. 
46 See FISHER, supra note 42, at 30-31. As Western medicine expanded during the nineteenth 
century, women's historical roles as healthcare providers for their gender were usurped by the 
larger male presence in the field. See id. Concepts of female health were altered by this new 
generation of doctors, and natural female processes were relegated to the status of "benign 
diseases." See id. Familiarity with women's health issues is still spotty today. See Betty Morris, Women 
and Health: Medicine Begins Filling in the Gap, FLA. TODAY, May 14,1996, at 1D. Of 126 medical 
schools in the United States, only one integrates these issues into the required coursework; only 
four offer residencies in women's health; and only one-fourth offer any classes at all on women's 
health issues, and when they do, it is usually an elective. See id. 
47 See FISHER, supra note 42, at 29-31; Peppin, Power and Disadvantage, supra note 43, at 
229-32. 
48 See Peppin, Power and Disadvantage, supra note 43, at 230; see also infra notes 136-38 and 
accompanying text (discussing the history of informed consent cases). 
49 See Napoli, supra note 37, at 355-57 (discussing how the professional and reasonable 
person standards for disclosure are insufficient to protect a woman's unique decision making 
process concerning reproductive organs, and suggesting a reasonable woman standard for dis-
closure and a subjective standard for causation). 
50 See Caroline Forell, Essentialism, Empathy, and the Reasonable Women, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 
769, 776 n.35 (also suggesting the same ineffectiveness of the doctrine in cases of mastectomies 
and episiotomies). 
51 See Napoli, supra note 37, at 339-40. 
52 See id. at 345-48. 
53 See id. at 340. The most common reason for the surgery is to relieve the discomfort of 
benign uterine fibroids. See id. Several studies say the total number of unnecessary or questionable 
hysterectomies is anywhere from 33% to 41 % of all those performed. See id. at 340 n.26. 
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for the overuse of the procedure without adequate informed consent.54 
The risks of the procedure may not be appreciated by the male-domi-
nated medical establishment because they view the uterus and proxi-
mate organs as having only one function, reproduction.55 However, 
these women exhibit symptoms of "post-hysterectomy syndrome" that 
are unrelated to reproductive capacity.56 In addition, it may also inter-
fere with a healthy sex life. 57 Perhaps the most obvious outcome of the 
procedure is the future impossibility of bearing children. This outcome 
figures into damage awards in lawsuits-even though the procedure 
was flawlessly performed-when the patient is misled into believing 
that surgery is medically necessary. 58 Physicians are also unlikely to 
discuss alternatives to hysterectomies because they may feel they are 
doing women a service by removing an organ they consider to be a 
repository for disease and inconvenience as women get older.59 
Unnecessary cesarean section rates are also high: in 1990, one 
study found that almost half were unwarranted.60 There are several 
reasons not related to gender-bias that may explain the high rate of 
cesarean sections,61 but gender does play some role in removing deci-
sionmaking to the physician.62 Doctors do not inform women of the 
54 See id. at 356-57. The overuse of these procedures may also represent the preference of 
"male-made" medical technology for more invasive procedures. See Kathryn Strother Ratcliff, 
Health Technologies for Women: Whose Health? Whose Technology?, in HEALING TECHNOLOGY: 
FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES, supra note 36, at 173, 174. 
55 See Napoli, supra note 37, at 357. 
56 See id. at 341. These women present symptoms including depression, hot flashes, urinary 
problems, fatigue, headaches, dizziness and insomnia. See id. These symptoms may indicate a 
reaction to losing a part of their female identity, a loss that may not be appreciated by male 
physicians. See id. at 355-56. 
57 See id. at 341. Some studies also show that the uterus may protect premenopausal women 
from heart disease and other health problems. See id. at 341 n.40. 
58 See Redford v. United States, No. 89-2324, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4712, at *40-41 (D.D.C. 
Apr. 10, 1992). This is true notwithstanding the fact that infertility is a commonly understood 
consequence. See id. at *28. 
59 See Napoli, supra note 37, at 357. 
60 See Kelly F. Bates, Note, Cesarean Section Epidemic: Defining the Problem-Approaching 
Solutions, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 389, 390 n.16 (1995). The mortality rate for the procedure is two 
to five times higher than that of vaginal birth. See id. at 391-92. The risk of harm other than 
death is 10 times higher. See Hilary E. Berkman, Note, A Discussion of Medical Malpractice and 
Cesarean Section, 70 OR. L. REv. 629, 635 (1991). 
61 Fear of medical malpractice liability is high on many doctors' lists. See Bates, supra note 
60, at 404-05. Financial gain is another reason, as cesareans costs at least twice as much as normal 
births. See Berkman, supra note 60, at 637. The procedure is also convenient for impatient 
physicians who do not want their work schedules dictated by the uncertainty and lengthiness of 
labor. See id. at 631 n.12. Women may also choose it for this reason. See id. at 631 n.13. 
62 See Berkman, supra note 60, at 631. A male predilection for invasive procedures may also 
explain its use disproportionate to necessity. See Ratcliff, supra note 54, at 174. 
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alternative of natural birth because they may believe that women are 
not anatomically structured to easily pass the baby from the uterus to 
vagina.63 Even in the absence of medical indications, doctors prefer 
cesarean sections because vaginal births are inherently complex.64 These 
doctors may believe that the difficulty attending vaginal birth out-
weighs the risks of cesarean sections, but they do not appreciate some 
of the more subtle, gender-specific risks of cesarean surgery, even when 
it is successfully performed. Women who undergo cesarean sections 
are less likely to become pregnant in the future. 65 Furthermore, these 
women relate that they feel deceived by their bodies, that it "doesn't 
work the way it should."66 They may also have a general dissatisfaction 
with the entire birthing experience.67 Such risks would surely be mate-
rial to a woman considering her options,68 but her decision is fre-
quently preempted because of the doctor's ignorance of these risks,69 
or through his self-serving assurances that a cesarean section is medi-
cally necessary.70 
B. The Unhappy Marriage of the Female Body with 
Medical Devices and Pharmaceuticals 
Corporate America has a male face.71 Since such a small percent-
age of women occupy prime managerial and decisionmaking positions 
in corporations, these corporations may not appreciate female perspec-
63 See Berkman, supra note 60, at 631. "One physician ... stated that, ' ... since women have 
been walking on two legs, their pelves are not in line for vaginal delivery .... You might say we're 
helping women do what nature hasn't evolved her to do for herself.'" Id. (quoting H. Marieskind, 
An Evaluation of Caesarean Section in the United States 177-78 (June 1979) (final report 
submitted to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare». 
64 See id. 
65 See id. at 635-36. This might be due to an aversion to the emotional trauma of major 
surgery connected with future births, or to a decreased biological ability to conceive. See id. 
66Id. at 635-36 n.32 (quoting N.W. COHEN & LJ. ESTNER, SILENT KNIFE 63-64 (1983». 
67 See id. at 636 n.34. 
68 See Berkman, supra note 60, at 648. 
69 See id. at 635-37. 
70 See supra notes 61, 64 and accompanying text. 
71 See Diane Kunde, Floor to Ceiling: Commission Aims to Eliminate Barriers on All Corporate 
Levels, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 9, 1993, at 1D (discussing a Department of Labor survey 
finding that only 6.6% of executives in 94 large corporations were women); David Benjamin 
Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 967 (1996) 
(stating that women occupied only 3% of top management positions in Fortune 1500 companies 
(citing FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMM'N, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF THE NA-
TION'S HUMAN CAPITAL 10-11 (1995»). 
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tives and needs, except as they relate to sales.72 While it is not clear if 
numerically women are disproportionately harmed by medical prod-
ucts,73 roughly half of all the punitive damages verdicts for women in 
products liability cases concern medical products; for men, the num-
ber is around ten percent.74 
The following products were marketed even though the manufac-
turers knew or had reason to believe that they were harmful. These 
products did in fact cause harm, killing or injuring thousands of 
women. They exemplify the magnitude and totality of gender-specific 
harm that can be avoided when warnings are given or when the 
product is not marketed in the first place. They show how important 
it is for manufacturers to be honest in the appraisal of their products, 
to warn women of inherent risks, and allow them to make thoughtful, 
informed decisions about their purchases. 75 
1. The Dalkon Shield 
AH. Robins first marketed the Dalkon Shield intrauterine contra-
ceptive device (IUD) in 1971, and enjoyed revenues of eleven million 
dollars until it was forced to abandon the domestic market in 1974 
after an FDA study linked the Shield to Pelvic Inflammatory Disease 
(PID) and spontaneous septic abortions.76 Through its own research, 
Robins knew that the Shield's design would lead to a greater risk of 
infection, but chose to suppress this information,'7 thus exposing 2.2 
72 SeeJoan E. Steinman, Women, Medical Care, and Mass Tort Litigation, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 
409,413 (1992). 
73 See id. However, some studies indicate that women may experience more adverse drug 
reactions than men. See Peppin, Feminism, supra note 39, at 88-89. 
74 See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 40, at 34-38. 
75 The manufacturer's duty to warn encompasses two distinct species: risk reduction warnings 
and informed choice warnings. SeeJames A. Henderson,Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse 
in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265, 285 (1990). Risk 
reduction warnings are instructional: they tell the consumer how to reduce the risks associated 
with the use of the product. See id. Informed choice warnings, on the other hand, inform the 
consumer that there is a nonreducible risk associated with the product; the warning exists so that 
the consumer may exercise his or her autonomy and decide whether the benefits of the product 
outweigh its risks. See id. 
76 See Deborah R. Hensler & Mark A. Peterson, Understanding Mass Personal Injury Litigation: 
A Socio-Legal Analysis, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 961, 983-84 (1993). The FDA's request to suspend 
domestic sales did little to affect marketing in foreign countries. See id. at 984. Robins continued 
foreign sales for another year, even selling unsterilized IUDs in underdeveloped countries, where 
poor health facilities would certainly contribute to greater mortality and injury rates. See Yanoshik 
& Norsigian, supra note 36, at 74-75. 
77 See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 76, at 984. 
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million American women (and roughly another two million world-
wide) to potentially fatal risks.78 In the end, its decision to withhold 
information was responsible for at least twenty deaths and 300,000 
injuries (as assumed from the total number of claims) of women in 
over fifty countries. 79 
2. Copper 7 IUD 
The Copper 7 IUD was manufactured by G.D. Searle & Co., and 
marketed specifically for women who had not yet had children.80 Un-
fortunately for this particular group of women, Copper 7's use was 
accompanied by a risk of infertility, PID, ectopic pregnancy, and per-
foration of the uterus. 81 Searle had a domestic and foreign market, and 
sold over eight million IUDs worldwide.82 Although it had won many 
of the early lawsuits,83 in 1988 a federal judge unsealed hundreds of 
the company's internal documents showing Searle's premarketing knowl-
edge of the product's inappropriateness for women who had not pre-
viously had children.84 The following trial ended with an $8.75 million 
jury verdict for the plaintiff, which in turn spawned a rush to settle the 
remaining claims.85 Searle was ultimately able to avoid litigating 350 
other claims by winning its argument against consolidation.86 
3. Super-Absorbent Tampon 
When the United States Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (CDC) first suspected in 1980 that super absorbent tampons may 
playa role in toxic shock syndrome (TSS), it came as no surprise to 
the manufacturers: they had known ofa possible link since 1975, when 
anecdotal evidence started to accumulate.87 A CDC request for data 
from the manufacturers about the suspected link yielded little infor-
78 See id. at 983. In addition, Robins originally touted the device as having a pregnancy rate 
of 1.1 % (they later lowered that number to .05% to boost lagging sales), when they knew the rate 
was greater than 5%. See id. at 983-84. 
79 See Yanoshik & Norsigian, supra note 36, at 73-74. 
80 See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 40, at 40-41. 
81 See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 76, at 987. 
82 See id. 
83 See id. Of the 775 claims filed by 1986, ten went to trial. See id. Searle prevailed in eight 
of those suits. See id. 
84 See id. 
85 See id. at 988. 
86 See Hensler & Peterson, supra note 76, at 988. 
87 See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 40, at 41-42. 
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mation.88 The manufacturers had collectively sat on their hands for five 
years, conducting no research on TSS and high-absorbency tampons.89 
As the first cases came to trial, it was discovered that Playtex was aware 
of the connection between unnecessary absorption capacity of tam-
pons and increased rates of TSS.90 The company had knowingly pro-
duced and advertised a product that was "far more absorbent than 
necessary for its intended effectiveness. ''91 Johnson & Johnson, another 
tampon manufacturer, had to pay punitive damages because a court 
held that the company knew of a possible link between TSS and 
super-absorbent tampons, but did no further research, even in light of 
repeated consumer complaints.92 
4. High Dosage Estrogen Oral Contraceptives 
In the end of the 1960s and beginning of the 1970s, the scientific 
and medical literature on adverse reactions to high doses of estrogen 
in birth control pills began to accumulate.93 Among the increased risks 
women were exposed to were acute renal failure, malignant hyperten-
sion, blood vessel wall lesions, and anemia, all of which are the symp-
toms of hemolytic uremic syndrome (HUS).94 The high dosage pill was 
also linked to thromboembolism (vessel obstructions caused by blood 
clots).95 Before 1976, twenty-one cases ofHUS were reported in women 
using the pill, a number which later rose to thirty-nine.96 In Great 
Britain, the high dosage pill's ''very decisive" association with throm-
boembolism was enough to quash its use almost entirely.97 Despite 
these indications, Ortho Pharmaceuticals persisted in aggressively mar-
88 See id. at 4l. 
89 See id. at 42. 
90 See id. One court stated, "Our review of the record reveals abundant evidence that Playtex 
deliberately disregarded studies and medical reports linking high-absorbency tampon[s] ... with 
... toxic shock at a time when other tampon manufacturers were responding ... by moditying 
or withdrawing their high-absorbency products." O'Gilvie v. Int'l Playtex, Inc., 821 F.2d 1438, 1446 
(10th Cir. 1987). 
91 O'Gi/vie, 821 F.2d at 1446. 
92 See West v.Johnson &Johnson Prods., Inc., 220 Cal. Rptr. 437, 459 (Ct. App. 1985). 
93 See Wooderson v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 681 P.2d 1038, 1053, 1062 (Kan. 1984). 
94 See id. at 1046-47. 
95 See id. at 1062. 
96 See id. at 1043, 1048. The symptoms abated in at least two of those women when they were 
taken off the oral contraception, but recurred when it was re-prescribed. See id. 
97 See Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 F.2d 652,658 (1st Cir. 1981). The British Committee 
on Safety of Drugs stated that it "did not feel that it could delay for months for a detailed analysis 
of the individual [dosage] preparations, since during each month several women would die 
unnecessarily and many others would suffer from avoidable hazard." Id. 
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keting the high dosage pill98 without adequate warnings.99 Ortho's 
salesmen were directed to "urge" Ortho-Novum 1/80 on practitioners, 
and mitigate the British studies by way of Ortho's own "analysis" of the 
data.lOo The reason for these tactics was the competitive market for 
birth control pills at the time: while many manufacturers made a lower 
dose pill, Ortho wanted to remain the leader in the high dose market 
which appeared to be dwindling in light of the scientific literature. lOI 
III. THE SINS OF THE BREAST IMPLANT MANUFACTURERS 
Although Dr. Angell alludes to the implants' apparent safety be-
cause of their thirty-year track record,102 she concedes that the manu-
facturer's claims of safety were misleading because there was no scien-
tific evidence in either direction. Io3 While this is true, en'ough evidence 
had accumulated to suggest to the manufacturers that implants might 
be causing some immune system disorders in addition to the known 
local complications. 
Since 1982, following the publication of the first article attempting 
to link CTDs to breast implants,104 researchers and physicians began to 
believe that silicone might have an effect on the immune system.105 
Although the patient sample size in the early studies was too small 
to extrapolate to the general population,106 they at least provided 
980rtho manufactured two doses of pill: a high-dose Ortho-Novum 1/80 (containing 80 
micrograms of estrogen) and a lower dose Ortho-Novum 1/50 (containing 50 micrograms). See 
Wooderson, 681 P.2d at 1063. Low-estrogen pills are just as effective as their high-estrogen coun-
terparts. See Brochu, 642 F.2d at 654. 
99 See Wooderson, 681 P.2d. at 1063. Before 1977, Ortho's package inserts did not mention 
any possible harm to renal systems. See id. at 1061. Subsequent inserts warned only of impaired 
renal function, not complete renal failure and the other symptoms suggested by the scientific 
literature. See id. 
100 See id. at 1063. 
101 See id. High dosage pills were eventually taken off of the market at the advice of the FDA. 
See High-Estrogen Oral Contraceptives To Be Discontinued, PR Newswire, Apr. 14, 1988, available in 
WESTLAW, Trade and Industry File. 
102 See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 62. 
103 See id. at 23. 
104 See id. at 52. Several articles had already been published by Japanese physicians indicating 
such a link, but the exposure to silicone in those cases was through direct injection of liquid 
silicone into the breast. See id. at 103-04. 
105 See id. at 105-08; see also Hearings Before the House Comm. on Government Reform and 
Oversight Subcomm. on Human Resources and Intergovernmental Relations and Subcomm. on Gov-
ernment Management, Information and Technology, Aug. 1, 1995, available in 1995 WESTLAW 
10382296 (testimony of John S. Sergent, M.D.) (stating that, like most rheumatologists, he 
thought the early scientific literature linking breast implants to immune disorders was cogent). 
106 See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 100. 
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manufacturers with a signal that something may be awry. When this is 
viewed in light of the nearly 5000 implant-related complaints the FDA 
received between 1983 and 1991,107 the resulting conclusion is that 
there were questions of safety that needed to be addressed by the manu-
facturers. 108 
Dow Corning had been doing its own research into the toxicity of 
liquid silicone in animals as early as the 1950s.109 Rats and dogs in these 
in-house studies proved sensitive to silicone-induced tumors and immune 
reactions. llo They also conducted several experiments that showed liq-
uid silicone being transported throughout the bodies of these animals, 
and depositing in their lymph nodes, adrenal glands, and kidneys. III 
Several internal memoranda existed proving that Dow Corning at 
least had a subjective belief that implants may be harmful. One memo-
randum discussed the gradual silicone gel "bleeding" through the 
implant envelope.1I2 Sales representatives were directed to wipe the oily 
slick from the outside of the implant before showing it to prospective 
buyers. ll3 This memorandum presents two issues. First, it is very sus-
ceptible to an interpretation that Dow Corning believed there were 
systemic dangers of silicone outside of the envelope as it migrated to 
the lymph nodes, and acted to conceal this.1l4 Second, it raises the 
possibility of a battery claim, as women had not consented to the direct 
contact of the liquid silicone with their bodies. ll5 
107 See Teresa Moran Schwartz, Punitive Damages and Regulated Products, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 
1335, 1349 (1993). 
108 The importance of reacting to anecdotal evidence is seen most clearly in smoking-related 
illnesses. For centuries, doctors had suspected a link between smoking and certain diseases. See 
SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REDUCING THE HEALTH CONSE-
QUENCES OF SMOKING: 25 YEARS OF PROGRESS 5 (1989). At the turn of this century, many doctors 
believed that smoking increased the risk of getting lung cancer. See id. Despite this evidence, 
warning labels were not required on cigarette packs until 1965. See Federal Cigarette Labeling 
and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965). 
109 See Artiglio v. Corning, Inc., No. D021243, ]CCP2754, 1996 WL 543450, at *2 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Sept. 25, 1996). 
110 See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 57-58. 
111 See Artiglio, 1996 WL 543450, at *2. However, animal data is not readily extrapolated to 
humans. See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 100. 
112 See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 58-59. 
113 See id. Other structural defects in the envelope were diminished by Dow. Their reported 
asymptomatic rupture rates were between .2 and 1.1 %; the FDA advisory panel later determined 
the real rate was from four to six percent. See Kessler, supra note 4, at 1713. 
114 See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 59-60. Of course, it is also possible that the manufacturers 
were concerned with aesthetics and just wanted to sell an attractive product. 
115 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 9, at 39-42 
(5th ed. 1984). 
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There were other memoranda that imply Dow Corning's knowl-
edge of the questionable safety of implants. One from 1976 urges 
members of Dow's Mammary Task Force to start research on long-term 
toxicological effects "over and above what [was then] underway. "116 
Another memorandum from 1977 recounts a Dow representative's 
meeting with plastic surgeons at an international conference. ll7 When 
asked if Dow Corning was conducting studies into the gel leakage and 
migration away from the breasts to other organs, the representative 
replied that he "assured them, with crossed fingers, that Dow Corning 
too had an active 'contracture/gel migration' study under way."118 A 
memo from 1990 relates how a Dow Corning attorney asked the medi-
cal director to destroy his analysis of data of complication rates attend-
ing breast implants. 119 
Warnings about the possibility of immune system-related disease 
were not put on the package inserts until 1985,120 roughly twenty-one 
years after the implants went on the market,121 thirty years after the 
initial animal studies,122 and three years after the first scientific paper 
was published suggesting such a link. 123 What we find then is that in 
relentless pursuit of their marketing goals, the manufacturers withheld 
material risks, which they could have reasonably believed existed, from 
consumers.124 
IV. LIABILITY AND CAUSATION 
The sine qua non of any successful tort action is causation in fact: 
if the defendant's negligent conduct was not the cause in fact of the 
\16 ANGELL, supra note 1, at 60. 
117 See Robert]. Gordon, Letters to the Editor: Dow Coming Created the Tort Monster, WALL ST. 
].,June 8, 1995, at A12. 
118 !d. 
119 See Dow Memo Alleges Ethics Breach, Data Destruction Request, MEALEY'S LITIG. REp.: 
BREAST IMPLANTS, Nov. 12, 1993, available in WESTLAW, MLRBI File. The other breast implant 
manufacturers were also aware of the potential problems with the implants. See, e.g., Texas Jury 
Awards Three Women $33 Million, MEALEY'S LITIG. REp.: BREAST IMPLANTS, Mar. 3, 1994, available 
in WESTLAW, MLRBI File (McGhan admitting that they knew about gel bleed through the 
implant envelope); Valentine Trial Begins in San Fransico, MEALEY'S LITIG. REp.: BREAST IM-
PLANTS, Feb. 23, 1995, available in WESTLAW, MLRBI File (plaintiffs attorney implicating Baxter 
in ignoring the data from early animal studies and relying on plastic surgeons to relate adverse 
reactions after implantation). 
120 See Dow CORNING CORP., BREAST IMPLANT PACKAGE INSERT (1985). 
121 See supra note l. 
122 See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text. 
123 See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
124 See ANGELL, supra note 1, at 60. 
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plaintiffs damages, then liability will not lie with the defendant. 125 The 
reason behind the requirement of causation is generally considered to 
be one of fairness in accountability.126 Defendants should only be liable 
if, by "intervening in the world, [they] have changed the course of 
events for the worse."127 Another compelling reason is society's desire 
for "moral space" in freedom of action.128 We treasure this freedom 
because we want to be able to evaluate our own conduct and assess the 
possible consequences. 129 Risk-taking or negligence that does not pro-
duce harm is therefore immune to civil liability because of the value 
we place on freedom of action.130 
Under this theory, the breast implant manufacturers should not 
be held liable, because their negligence-marketing breast implants 
without providing warnings about risks they could have reasonably 
believed existed-was not the cause in fact of women's illnesses. l3l 
Freedom of action would therefore support the breast implant manu-
facturers' decision to act negligently and sell a potentially dangerous 
product, because they determined that the risk of harm was out-
weighed by the implants' benefits, and because the risk never materi-
125 See KEETON, supra note ll5, § 41, at 263-66. It is a necessary element procedurally because 
the plaintiffs claim generally cannot advance without it. See id. It is also a necessary element in 
that but for the cause, the harm would not exist. See id. Dr. Angell states it in application perhaps 
more succinctly when she writes, "The manufacturer cannot be held negligent if the implants 
didn't cause the harm, and the implants cannot be blamed if there is no harm." ANGELL, supra 
note I, at 112. 
126 See Tony Honore, Necessary and Sufficient Conditions in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAw 363,385 (David C. Owen ed., 1995). 
127Id. 
128 See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Remarks on Causation and Liamlity, 13 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 101, 
108 (1984) [hereinafter Thomson, Remarks on Causation]. 
129 See id. 
130 An illustration of this concept is found in Professor Thomson's depiction of Alfred and 
Bert, two homeowners backing their cars out of their respective driveways. See Judith Jarvis 
Thomson, The Decline of Cause, 76 CEO. LJ. 137, 139-40 (1987). Neither man looks for pedes-
trians as he approaches the street, but only Bert runs over someone. See id. Both men are 
negligent, and we can chastise them for their shoddy driving, but we heap additional legal blame 
on Bert because he caused tortious harm. See id. Alfred's conduct, however, will not have legal 
blame attached: freedom of action supports his choice to drive negligently because he evaluated 
his situation, decided that he had a (presumably) good reason for driving negligently, and, most 
importantly, injured no one through his negligence. See id. However, society does not respect all 
freedoms. Certain conduct is criminalized even when it does not cause harm, on the theory that 
if allowed to continue, harm will eventually occur. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT,JR., 
CRIMINAL LAW § 1.3, at 12-13 (2d ed. 1986). Therefore, some non-injurious conduct will require 
legal sanctions in the form of criminal penalties. See id. 
131 See supra notes 13-14, 21 and accompanying text (discussing the scientific evidence that 
implants are not associated with increased risks of CTDs). 
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alized.132 Essentially, the breast implant manufacturers have committed 
no legal wrong (notwithstanding the jury verdicts against them), at 
least based on the current scientific evidence, despite their inaction, 
misrepresentation, and nondisclosure.133 
Although any future litigation over breast implants would prob-
ably be decided in the manufacturers' favor, this still does not seem 
like a fair result. What makes this outcome unsatisfying and discom-
forting is that the manufacturers would be found not liable only be-
cause they were lucky enough to have produced a safe product. The 
fact that they potentially exposed women to a degree of harm on the 
order of what was seen in the IUD cases is of no consequence; nor is 
it of any consequence that they perpetuated the historic mistreatment 
of women in healthcare, where women's own risk-benefit analyses have 
been substituted by analyses based on bias, ignorance, or greed. 
V. REDEFINING THE HARM: A CAUSE OF ACTION FOUNDED IN A 
DIGNITARY TORT OF INFORMED CONSENT 
What would a fair outcome entail in the breast implant case? The 
issues of concern are compensating women for the insult to their 
dignity and restituting them for their submission to an expensive 
procedure they otherwise might not have undergone if they knew the 
possible risks; deterring the dishonest and potentially dangerous cor-
porate practices in the marketing of products; and being fair to the 
manufacturers, at least in the fact that they caused no tangible physical 
harm. It is difficult to reconcile these issues without first discerning the 
real harm that the manufacturers caused the individual plaintiffs. 
The problem presented by the lack of physical harm can be 
circumvented if we redefine the type of harm the plaintiffs suffered. 
Although historically tort law has compensated only physical or eco-
132 See Thomson, Remarks on Causation, supra note 128, at 108. 
133 Applying a criminality rationale to the breast implant manufacturers conduct could pos-
sibly be accomplished through statute. See generally Sherry Schnell & Susan M. Swafford, Federal 
Food and Drug Act Violations, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 407 (1995). But see Michael Rustad, In Defense 
of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. 
REv. 1, 85-86 (1992) (questioning the effectiveness of relatively insubstantial criminal penalties 
in deterring corporate misbehavior). 
In the eyes of the public, however, marketing a product with the subjective belief that it may 
cause harm is most certainly a criminal act. A study of people's attitudes about the seriousness 
of crime found that "[a] drug company executive [who allowed] his company to market a drug 
'knowing that it may produce harmful side-effects for most individuals' was rated in the United 
States as committing a crime more serious than all of the FBI index offenses except murder and 
rape."JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY &--7 (1984). 
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nomic i~ury, the move has been to increase the scope of harm that 
tort law will redress. 134 Among these newly recognized harms is failure 
to obtain informed consent. 135 
The doctrine of informed consent is familiarly applied to physi-
cian conduct.136 Although actions under informed consent were origi-
nally brought under a theory of battery,137 they now sound in negli-
gence, and the plaintiff must prove that the doctor's nondisclosure of 
risks fell below the standard of care. 138 The concept and dignitary 
protections of medical informed consent are also present in a manu-
facturer's duty to warn consumers of the nonreducible risks of their 
134 See Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 136, 140-58 (1992) (explaining that 
tort law now protects privacy, emotional well-being, relational interests, and informational and 
process rights). 
135 See id. at 150-52. 
136The doctrine of informed consent requires doctors to inform patients of "the nature of 
the pertinent ailment or condition, the risks of the proposed treatment or procedure, and the 
[availability and] risks of any alternative methods of treatment, including the risks of failing to 
undergo any treatment at all." KEETON, supra note ll5, § 32, at 190. If this information is not 
disclosed, the patient's otherwise valid consent to a procedure is vitiated, and the doctor may be 
held liable for adverse consequences that should have been disclosed-even those arising from 
non-negligently performed procedures. See id. The physician need not disclose risks "commonly 
understood, obvious, or already known to the patient." Id. §32, at 192. The standard of disclosure 
in some states is a professional one: the risks and alternatives that a reasonable doctor in the 
medical community would divulge. See, e.g., Rush v. Miller, 648 F.2d 1075, 1076 (6th Cir. 1981). 
In other jurisdictions, what must be disclosed is measured by what information would be material 
to a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 
786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The latter standard is probably more in line with protecting the patient's 
autonomy because it does not allow a physician to substitute his medical judgment for the 
patient's personal cost-benefit analysis in deciding to undergo a medical procedure. See id. 
The standard of causation in a majority of states is whether a reasonable patient would have 
refused the proposed treatment if they were informed of the risks or alternatives. See, e.g., id. at 
790-91. Other courts, believing that an objective standard impairs the right to self-determination, 
hold that decision-causation should be determined under a subjective standard: whether disclo-
sure would have affected the decision of this patient, the plaintiff. See, e.g., Scott v. Bradford, 606 
P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979). 
All states agree that the plaintiffs claim fails in the absence of bodily injury caused by the 
nondisclosure. See Alan Meisel, A "Dignitary Tort" as a Bridge Between the Idea of Informed Consent 
and the Law of Informed Consent, 16 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 210, 2ll (1988) [hereinafter 
Meisel, Dignitary Tort]. If the undisclosed risk does not materialize, the nondisclosure "however 
unpardonable, is legally without consequence." Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790. 
137 See KEETON, supra note ll5, § 18, at 120. The idea was that if the patient consented to a 
medical procedure without being fully informed of the risks, his consent was vitiated and the 
doctor's contact was constructively unwanted and offensive. See generally id. 
138 See id. § 32, at 190. Claims in battery are now reserved for cases where the patient has not 
consented at all to a procedure, Scott, 606 P.2d at 557, or where the procedure or nature of the 
touching is significantly different from the one for which consent was given, Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 
262 N.W.2d 684, 699 (Minn. 1977). 
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products, where it is more accurately called informed choice.l39 The 
standard of disclosure of risks in the physician-patient context can be 
similar to that in a products liability case. 140 
In either context, the plaintiff must show that the risk that should 
have been disclosed actually materialized. l41 Among medical informed 
consent scholars, this requirement has been criticized as being anti-
thetical to the autonomy rights the doctrine purports to protect. 142 The 
fact that the harm from the undisclosed risk did not arise is irrele-
vant-the violation of the person's right to self-determination is itself 
the harm. 143 If the doctrine of informed consent is truly freighted with 
concerns for autonomy, bodily integrity, dignity, and the decisionmak-
139 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 75, at 286-87; James E. Britain, Product Honesty Is 
the Best Policy: A Comparison of Doctors' and Manufacturers' Duty to Disclose Drug Risks and the 
Importance of Consumer Expectations in Determining Product Defect, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 342, 369 
(1984); see also Hopfinger v. Kidder Int'l, Inc., 827 F. Supp. 1444, 1451 (W.D. Mo. 1993) ("In-
formed consent and allowing a person to take safety precautions is the point to [al theory of 
recovery [based on failure to warnl."). Indeed, the entire concept has its roots in "the mid-twen-
tieth century demands of citizens for protection of their rights as consumers .... " Alan Meisel, 
Informed Consent: Who Decides for Whom?, in MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAw 197, 198 (Marc D. 
Hiller ed., 1981) [hereinafter Meisel, Informed Consentl. 
140 Compare Canterlrnry, 464 F.2d at 786-87 ("[Tlhe test for determining whether a particular 
peril must be divulged is its materiality to the patient's decision: all risks potentially affecting the 
decision must be unmasked.") with Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 
(5th Cir. 1973) ("[Al consumer is entitled to make his own choice as to whether the product's 
utility or benefits justify exposing himself to the risk of harm. Thus, a true choice situation arises, 
and a duty to warn attaches, whenever a reasonable man would want to be informed of the risk 
in order to decide whether to expose himself to it.") and Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 
691 F.2d 8ll, 814 (6th Cir. 1982) (same) and Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v.Janssens, 463 So. 2d 
242,251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (same). 
In addition, a manufacturer's duty to warn is not limited to risks that are known with 
certainty. See Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E. 2d 831, 837 (Ohio 1981) ("[Wlhere scientific 
or medical evidence exists tending to show that a certain danger is associated with use of the 
[product], the manufacturer may not ignore or discount that information in drafting its warning 
solely because it finds it to be unconvincing. "). 
141 See Canterlrnry, 464 F.2d at 790 (medical informed consent). See generally KEETON, supra 
note ll5, §§ 98-99, at 692-702 (products liability duty to warn). 
142 See KATZ, supra note 41, at 79 (,This [requirementl, however pertinent to negligence law, 
demonstrates strikingly how far the court had strayed from its root premise."); Meisel, Dignitary 
Tort, supra note 139, at 211 ("[Tlhe rules by which the doctrine is administered in the courts ... 
inadequately protect the fundamental right of individuals as patients .... "). 
143 See KATZ, supra note 41, at 79; see also Meisel, Informed Consent, supra note 139, at 204 
("If the doctrine's avowed individualistic purposes ... are to be honored, then the failure to 
disclose information disserves these purposes. It makes no difference that the patient incurred 
no bodily harm; the failure to disclose is [itself] a harm .... "); Joseph Goldstein, For Harold 
Lasswell: Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and the Plea Bargain, 
84 YALE L. J. 683, 691 (1975) ("The materialized risk requisite demonstrates the extent to which 
the concept has departed from its purpose. It does not recognize that a citizen can be wronged 
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ing process, then it should be flexible enough to remedy wrongs 
unrelated to physical harm.144 This could be accomplished in several 
ways. The requirement of materialized risk in a negligence-based in-
formed consent claim could be abandoned, or a return to a theory 
based on battery could be implemented.145 Either basis for the action 
would create a dignitary tort of informed consent.146 
Application of such a dignitary tort in the breast implant case 
would be the fairest way to compensate women and encourage full 
disclosure by the manufacturers. Although it is possible to extrapolate 
from a dignitary tort of informed consent to one of informed choice 
(i.e., the manufacturer's failure to warn without causing physical harm 
is itself a compensable tort), 147 it is wiser to keep any claims in a medical 
context.148 The application of a dignitary tort of informed consent to 
manufacturers of medical products would be premised on the overlap-
ping roles of the manufacturer and physician. The distinction between 
these roles is blurred for breast implants because of the necessity of 
surgery for implantation. In the case of most pharmaceuticals and 
medical devices, the duty to warn the patient is satisfied when the 
manufacturer warns the physician because the physician must, by law, 
pass this information on to the patient-the so-called learned interme-
diary doctrine.149 Despite the disjunction of the relevant parties, the 
without being 'harmed,' that his dignity as a human being has been violated ... the moment the 
deceiving authority commences therapy .... "). 
144The courts still consistently decline to award even nominal damages for nondisclosure 
without harm. See, e.g., Culbertson v. Mernitz, 591 N.E.2d 1040, 1042--43 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); 
Hales v. Pittman, 576 P.2d 493, 499 (Ariz. 1978). 
145The law of battery would work because injurious contact is not a prerequisite; offensive 
touching alone will support a claim. See Meisel, Dignitary Tort, supra note 136, at 211. 
146 See id. at 216-17. Other commentators have suggested alternative means to avoid the 
materialized risk requirement. One has suggested focusing on a medical decision making interest 
modeled on existing tort and contract protections of similar and related decision making interests. 
See Marjorie Maguire Shultz, 95 YALE L. J. 219, 276-92 (1985). Another considers nondisclosure 
to be an interference with a process right in decision making, and would extend this right to 
products liability duty to warn cases. See Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision 
Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 607, 648-64. 
147 See supra notes 139--40 and accompanying text (discussing the similar policy goals each 
doctrine advances). 
148The problem with keeping it as a failure to warn claim is that this theory may eventually 
be preempted by federal regulation. See Desmarais v. Dow Corning Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13, 16 (D. 
Conn. 1989) (holding that the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 to the Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act would preempt some failure to warn cases if the implants were received after 
enactment) . 
149 See Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89, 94-95 (D. Md. 1989). 
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manufacturer is still directly liable to the patient for harm that arises 
if the manufacturer breaches its duty to warn.150 In the breast implant 
cases, the manufacturers did not divulge all of the risks that may have 
been material to a woman's decision, including the ones they reason-
ably believed could be true (the effects on immune systems) and those 
they knew were true (the silicone leakage through the implant enve-
lope). It is therefore possible to view the breast implant manufacturers' 
nondisclosure and misrepresentation as an interference with a woman's 
ability to gain full understanding of the risks of breast implants, and 
thus their failure to warn may be collapsed into a failure to obtain 
medical informed consent. 151 Since the potential harm never devel-
oped, they should not be held liable for the plaintiffs' diseases, but 
they should still have to answer for their interference with a woman's 
right to make an informed choice in a medical procedure. Under a 
dignitary tort of informed consent, the compensation might be nomi-
nal, but the egregious conduct of the breast implant manufacturers 
would warrant punitive damages.152 This would deter other manufac-
turers from testing their luck by marketing products without knowing 
if they are truly safe and without providing adequate and meaningful 
warnings. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Women have not received the pure benefits and proper treatment 
one would expect in this medically and technologically advanced age. 
This has often been due to the ignorance and bias of the medical 
profession, but the greater harms perpetrated against women have 
their roots in the greed of pharmaceutical and medical device manu-
facturers. These manufacturers have harmed women in visible ways, 
but the affront to their dignity has often gone unnoticed, either be-
cause the physical injury was so overwhelming or because the courts 
150 See McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974). Although the physician 
is merely the conduit through which the information flows from manufacturer to patient, the 
patient's informed consent will ultimately be based on his or her own analysis of the risks disclosed 
by the physician. See id. 
151 A conflation of the two concepts is not chimerical. Throughout the breast implant debate, 
physicians and ethicists referred to a lack of informed consent as being its central ethical 
dilemma. See generally Judy Foreman, Implants: Is Uninformed Consent a Woman's Right?, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 13, 1992, at 25. 
152Punitive damage awards are not completely alien to cases where informed consent is 
lacking. See Koenig & Rustad, supra note 40, at 69-71. 
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had not yet recognized the primacy of a person's right to choose what 
shall be done with his or her body. The breast implant controversy 
brings this dignitary right to the forefront. Only when the courts 
appreciate this right for what it is-an inviolable right protecting bodily 
integrity and autonomy, one which is already recognized in other areas 
of tort law153-will they begin to restore women's decisionmaking ca-
pabilities. 
153 For example, the tort of battery is generally understood to protect a person's interest in 
bodily integrity. See KEETON, supra note 115, § 9, at 40. 
